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Abstract
Over the last decade, there have been significant changes in data sharing policies and in the data sharing environment
faced by life science researchers. Using data from a 2013 survey of over 1600 life science researchers, we analyze the effects
of sharing policies of funding agencies and journals. We also examine the effects of new sharing infrastructure and tools (i.e.,
third party repositories and online supplements). We find that recently enacted data sharing policies and new sharing
infrastructure and tools have had a sizable effect on encouraging data sharing. In particular, third party repositories and
online supplements as well as data sharing requirements of funding agencies, particularly the NIH and the National Human
Genome Research Institute, were perceived by scientists to have had a large effect on facilitating data sharing. In addition,
we found a high degree of compliance with these new policies, although noncompliance resulted in few formal or informal
sanctions. Despite the overall effectiveness of data sharing policies, some significant gaps remain: about one third of grant
reviewers placed no weight on data sharing plans in their reviews, and a similar percentage ignored the requirements of
material transfer agreements. These patterns suggest that although most of these new policies have been effective, there is
still room for policy improvement.
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Introduction
In the life sciences, collegial sharing of research resources–data,
methods, and materials–is believed to play a critical role in
scientific progress [1]. Prompt and widespread dissemination of
new methods and findings allows scientists to build on each other’s
work quickly and to speed the advancement of science; failure to
share can lead to needlessly duplicative research, unproductive
lines of inquiry, and delays in scientific innovation.
Inherent in the practice of scientific sharing, however, are
tensions between what is in the public interest and what is in the
private interest of individual scientists [2], [3]. While science
advances through the open dissemination of information, scientists
are rewarded for their individual scientific contributions and
ability to amass scientific priority and individual credit. Although
there may be large public returns from scientists sharing with each
other, there can be a large private cost to individuals from sharing
in terms of lost scientific productivity and scientific lead, and lost
opportunities for financial gain. These individual interests act as a
brake or constraint on unfettered data sharing in the sciences.
Previous empirical research has shown that, despite the stated
consensus of data sharing as a professional ideal, a great deal of
secrecy and data withholding behavior still exists in the life
sciences. In a 2000 survey, Campbell et al. showed that 44% of
geneticists and 32% of other life scientists had engaged in some
form of data withholding in the previous 3 years [4]. The desire to
protect one’s scientific lead and preserve the proprietary value of
one’s data were important factors in withholding behavior. Similar
estimates–obtained through surveys, public data searches, and
field experiments–have since been reported in various subfields of
genetics and other life sciences [5–12].
Since Campbell’s original survey, there have been important
data sharing policy developments within the life sciences. In an
effort to encourage more data sharing, the NIH began requiring a
data sharing plan in 2003 for grant applications with anticipated
annual costs greater than $500,000 [13]. Other funding agencies
and organizations, including the National Science Foundation
(NSF), the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and the Wellcome
Trust, have followed suit [14–16]. In the area of genetics–
beginning with the Human Genome Project where the importance
of collaboration and the public goods effects of genomic data were
abundantly clear early on–repositories such as the Database of
Genotypes and Phenotypes, the Online Mendelian Inheritance in
Man database, and the Database of Single Nucleotide Polymor-
phisms, were created to facilitate the sharing of data [17]. These
types of repositories and other data sharing infrastructure and
tools, such as online supplements, have also become more popular
with journals as efficient ways of ensuring the dissemination of
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Genomic Data Sharing (GDS) Policy, to be effective beginning
2015, that broadens genomic data sharing requirements for NIH-
funded projects [19].
To examine the effects of these policy developments and
changes in the data sharing environment that have emerged over
the last decade, we fielded a survey of life science researchers in
early 2013 on the topic of data sharing and withholding. This
survey included many items that were identical to the 2000
Campbell data sharing and withholding survey [4] so we could
assess changes in the practices and attitudes of researchers. We
report our findings on trends of data sharing and withholding
elsewhere [20]. In this paper, we focus on policies and new
technologies that impinge on data sharing. In particular, we
analyze the perceived effects of sharing policies of funding agencies
and journals as well as of new sharing infrastructure and tools such
as third party repositories and online supplements. We find that
recently enacted data sharing policies and new data sharing
infrastructure and tools have had a sizable effect on encouraging
data sharing. In particular, third party repositories and online
supplements as well as the data sharing requirements of funding
agencies, particularly the NIH and the National Human Genome
Research Institute (NHGRI), were perceived by scientists to have
had a large effect on facilitating data sharing. In addition, we
found a high degree of compliance with these new policies,
although noncompliance resulted in few formal or informal
sanctions. Despite the overall effectiveness of data sharing policies,
some significant gaps remain: about one third of grant reviewers
placed no weight on data sharing plans in their reviews, and a
similar percentage ignored the requirements of material transfer
agreements (MTAs). These patterns suggest that although most of
these new policies have been effective, there is still room for policy
improvement.
Data and Methods
Sample Selection
In 2013, we fielded a mail survey of academic life science
researchers working in US institutions. We obtained a sample of
3000 researchers using a sampling strategy identical to that used
by Campbell in 2000 [4].
Our sample consisted of researchers from four different strata: a
clinical department stratum, a nonclinical department stratum, a
genetics department stratum, and a Human Genome Project
(HGP)/NHGRI investigator stratum. Three of the strata (clinical,
nonclinical, and genetics) comprised researchers employed at US
universities and medical schools identified as the top institutional
recipients of extramural NIH support (more below). The fourth
stratum consisted of individual recipients of HGP and/or NHGRI
grants.
To derive the eligible population for the clinical, nonclinical,
and genetics strata, we reviewed all NIH grants awarded during
FY 2010 and identified the 100 US universities and medical
schools that had been the top institutional recipients of these
grants. We also identified the types of departments that received
the most NIH funding, classifying them as either a clinical or a
nonclinical department. We identified the top 5 clinical depart-
mental types (internal medicine, psychiatry, pediatrics, pathology,
and neurology) and the top 5 nonclinical departmental types
(biochemistry, microbiology/immunology/virology, pharmacolo-
gy, biology, and physiology). Because of our special interest in
genetics, genetics departments were placed in a separate category
in our classification system. We then randomly selected, at each of
the top 100 institutions, one clinical department, one nonclinical
department, and all genetics departments and programs (i.e., if
two or more genetics programs existed within the same institution,
all were selected into the sample).
After selecting the departments, we obtained the names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of the primary research faculty
in each department from departmental and university websites.
We used this methodology to populate the clinical stratum,
nonclinical stratum, and genetics stratum. Because of the survey’s
focus on researchers, faculty members in the clinical stratum were
eligible only if they had published at least one research article
listed in the National Library of Medicine’s Medline database
within the last 3 years.
We also added a fourth stratum consisting of principal
investigators who had been directly funded by the HGP and/or
the NHGRI in the last 5 years. These included researchers from
the top 100 institutions previously identified (duplicates removed),
other academic institutions, and independent research centers.
The final stratified sample of 3000 faculty members included all
483 investigators from the HGP/NHGRI stratum, 1317 faculty
members in genetics departments (for a total of 1800 faculty
members with some genetics association), 600 faculty members in
selected nonclinical departments, and 600 faculty members in
selected clinical departments. Faculty members in clinical,
nonclinical, and genetics departments were selected at random
from their respective strata.
Survey Instrument Design and Administration
The design of the survey instrument was informed by 3 focus
group discussions with geneticists and other life scientists, 10 semi-
structured interviews with geneticists, a critical review by an expert
panel of biomedical and social science researchers, and reviews of
the literature. Focus groups comprising geneticists and other life
scientists (e.g. immunologists, microbiologists, computational
biologists) were convened at three large academic medical centers.
The sampling frame for the focus groups consisted of all academic
faculty working in genetics, human genetics, and other life science
departments at these centers. Scientists were selected at random,
with oversampling of geneticists, to receive invitations to
participate in the focus groups. At each site, a focus group
consisting of 6–8 scientists was formed from among those who
agreed to participate.
The purpose of the focus groups was to provide updated
definitions for the key concepts, variables, and questions to be used
in the survey as well as to identify newly emerging themes in data
sharing. A list of the seed questions asked during the focus groups
is reported in Appendix S1.
Because some scientists may find it difficult to express their
attitudes towards and experiences with data sharing and
withholding with complete candor during focus group sessions,
we also conducted 10 confidential, personal interviews. Scientists
selected for one-on-one interviews were chosen from among
individuals who had been invited to participate in focus groups but
who had been unable to attend the focus group meeting. These
semi-structured interviews broached topics and questions similar
to those in the focus group meetings.
Using information gleaned from the focus groups, personal
interviews, the original 2000 survey, and a review of the current
literature, we developed the new instrument on data sharing and
data withholding. This instrument included both questions from
the 2000 survey and new survey items on topics that emerged
during the focus groups, interviews, and literature review. An
expert panel of biomedical and social science researchers was
asked to critique the new survey instrument. After the changes
suggested by the panel were incorporated into the survey, the
Codifying Collegiality
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October 2012 and fielded January–June 2013.
To maximize comparability with the previous survey and
minimize mode effects, this survey was conducted in the same way
as the 2000 survey, via mail. Subjects were sent a cover letter
describing the study, the survey instrument, a postage-paid
postcard, and a monetary incentive in the form of a check. They
were asked to complete the survey anonymously and mail the
completed survey and, separately, the postcard. Receipt of the
postcard would allow Harris to confirm that the subject’s survey
had been completed but would ensure respondents’ complete
anonymity because the survey instrument had no unique
identifying information. Nonresponse to the initial mail survey
was followed up with a second mailing and up to 3 telephone calls.
All elements of the survey protocol were approved by the Partners
Human Research Committee.
Response Rates
Of the 3000 life scientists in our original sample, 147
respondents were deemed ineligible because they had died, had
retired, were on sabbatical, were out of the country, were not
located at the sampled institution, or did not hold faculty
appointments. Of the remaining 2853 eligible scientists, 1165
completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 41%. There was
good representation in responses across the 4 strata sampled, with
response rates of 35% (157/454) among NHGRI grant recipients,
42% (530/1262) among researchers in the genetics department
sample, 38% (210/557) among researchers in the clinical
department sample, and 46% (268/580) among researchers in
the nonclinical department sample.
Dependent Variables and Measures
The exact wording of the survey questions that were analyzed is
reproduced in Appendix S2. We analyzed survey items related to
the influence of funding agency policies, publication policies,
intellectual property policies, informal policies, and training on
respondents’ sharing of information and biomaterials with other
academic scientists. Respondents were asked to rate whether these
policies had a large influence against sharing, a small influence
against sharing, no influence, a small influence towards sharing, or
a large influence towards sharing.
We also analyzed items related to data sharing infrastructure
and tools such as online supplements and third party repositories.
In particular, we examined the frequency with which researchers
submitted information using these tools (yes or no) and ratings of
whether these infrastructure and tools hindered or helped
respondents’ research (hindered a lot, hindered a little, no effect,
helped a little, helped a lot).
Finally, we looked at questions related to respondents’
experience with the data sharing requirements and restrictions of
genome-wide association studies and MTAs.
Statistical Analyses
All proportions reported in the text, tables, and figures were
weighted to account for different probabilities of selection from the
four strata and for nonresponse. All analyses were done using
Stata/SE 13.1 (StataCorp, College Station, TX).
Results
Table 1 reports the characteristics of researchers for the full
sample and for the 4 subsamples (NHGRI principal investigators,
faculty in genetics departments, faculty in clinical departments,
and faculty in nonclinical departments). In the full sample, 29% of
respondents were female, and 80% had been trained in the US.
Most respondents reported their highest degree to be a PhD
(75%), with a substantial minority (14%) reporting an MD degree,
and 9% reporting both MD and PhD degrees. There was a wide
range of professional experience represented in the sample: 13%
had received their highest degree fewer than 10 years ago while
29% had received their degrees more than 30 years ago. About
half of the full sample were full professors.
Across the different subsamples, respondent characteristics were
similar along most dimensions, with the exception of: the highest
degree held, the number of publications in the last 3 years, and
whether the respondent was involved in human subjects research.
Not surprisingly, those in the clinical subsample were more likely
to hold MD degrees and were more likely to be involved in human
subjects research; respondents in the NHGRI subsample reported
more publications than those in the other subsamples.
Influence of Data Sharing Policies
Of the new data sharing policies that have been enacted since
2000, the policies of NIH were reported to have had the greatest
impact on facilitating data sharing. As Figure 1 shows, 65% of
respondents thought that NIH policies had been influential in
increasing data sharing. NIH policies were rated particularly
highly among self-identified geneticists (indicated by asterisks in
the figure), with 75% of genetics researchers rating these policies as
having been influential in facilitating data sharing. Among
geneticists, NHGRI and Genome-Wide Association Study
(GWAS) policies were thought to also facilitate data sharing, but
to a lesser degree, than other NIH policies. Policies of non-NIH
funding organizations such as NSF, other government agencies,
and private foundations had a modest impact on increasing data
sharing (31%–34%).
Journal publication policies were perceived by scientists to have
had only a moderate effect on data sharing: 35% of respondents
reported that journal publication policies had a positive influence
towards facilitating data sharing. More than half (55%), however,
reported that these policies had had no influence on sharing.
Individual instruction through formal courses also had only a
modest effect on data sharing, with 39% rating formal instruction
as having had an influence on encouraging sharing. Informal
training, however, through advisors or as reflected through the
practices of others working in the field, were thought to have had a
greater influence: 58% and 51% of respondents rated the practices
of advisors and the norms of their field, respectively, as having
been influential in encouraging data sharing.
In addition to policies that have been developed to encourage
data sharing, there has also been the expansion of policies that
discourage sharing. Intellectual property policies, which are put in
place to protect the potential financial interests of universities and
firms, impose conditions on what information and materials can
be shared, thereby acting as a brake on scientific sharing. The
bottom panel of Figure 1 shows respondents’ ratings of the
influence of intellectual property policies such as MTAs, technol-
ogy transfer agreements, and industry nondisclosure agreements.
The larger shares of the bars shaded black show that intellectual
property policies, relative to the policies discussed earlier, have had
a substantial influence against data sharing. Twenty percent of
respondents thought that institutional material transfer agreements
had been influential in discouraging data sharing, and 25% of
respondents thought the same of other technology transfer policies.
Similarly, industry agreements and commercial activities (such as
potential patents and royalties) were thought to impede sharing.
These findings suggest that industry relationships have somewhat
Codifying Collegiality
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research [6], [11].
Compliance With Policy Requirements
Compliance with sharing requirements varied across domains
and policies. We asked respondents about their compliance with
the sharing policies of professional journals and, if applicable,
GWAS policies and MTAs at their institutions. In general, there
was a high degree of compliance with journals’ requirements
related to the sharing of methods, data, and biomaterials. Almost
all respondents (92%) reported always having submitted, when
required to do so, a detailed description of their methods as an
online supplement; 8% of respondents only sometimes submitted
this description. Slightly lower percentages reported always
submitting, when required, data as an online supplement (89%)
or to a third party repository (90%). There was somewhat less
compliance with submitting biomaterials to a third party
repository (83%).
Researchers who conduct a GWAS funded by NIH are
required to deposit data from the study into a designated
repository, the Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP).
dbGaP makes the information from these studies immediately
available to the public; as an incentive for prompt data sharing,
researchers are given a 12-month exclusivity period in which they
and their collaborators are the sole authors permitted to publish
work based on this data [21]. In this survey, we asked self-
identified geneticists about data sharing related to GWAS. Among
respondents who had conducted or collaborated on a GWAS in
the last 3 years (n=124), 75% reported being required to deposit
data into a third party repository. Among those required to deposit
data, 96% complied with this requirement. In addition, we found
that most GWAS researchers were able to take advantage of the
exclusivity period: 77% of those who submitted their data were
able to submit their first publication using this data within 12
months.
Whereas journals and funding agencies have focused on policies
that expand data sharing, universities and academic medical
Table 1. Characteristics of survey respondents.
Number of Respondents (%)
Variable Full Sample NHGRI Subsample Genetics Subsample Clinical Subsample Nonclinical Subsample
Gender
Female 342 (29%) 42 (27%) 162 (31%) 73 (35%) 65 (24%)
Male 809 (69%) 111 (71%) 362 (68%) 135 (64%) 201 (75%)
Highest degree
MD 162 (14%) 14 (9%) 37 (7%) 97 (46%) 14 (5%)
PhD 873 (75%) 121 (77%) 436 (82%) 84 (40%) 232 (87%)
MD-PhD 101 (9%) 13 (8%) 40 (8%) 27 (13%) 21 (8%)
Trained in the US
Yes 930 (80%) 133 (85%) 431 (81%) 161 (77%) 205 (76%)
No 226 (19%) 21 (13%) 96 (18%) 48 (23%) 61 (23%)
Years since highest degree
0–5 32 (3%) 5 (3%) 11 (2%) 11 (5%) 5 (2%)
6–10 117 (10%) 15 (10%) 53 (10%) 33 (16%) 16 (6%)
11–20 354 (30%) 51 (32%) 151 (28%) 61 (29%) 91 (34%)
21–30 310 (27%) 45 (29%) 156 (29%) 54 (26%) 55 (21%)
31–40 231 (20%) 26 (17%) 108 (20%) 30 (14%) 67 (25%)
.40 101 (9%) 8 (5%) 42 (8%) 19 (9%) 32 (12%)
Academic rank
Full professor 567 (49%) 90 (57%) 262 (49%) 75 (36%) 140 (52%)
Associate professor 299 (26%) 40 (25%) 136 (26%) 49 (23%) 74 (28%)
Assistant professor 237 (20%) 20 (13%) 113 (21%) 57 (27%) 47 (18%)
Instructor or Lecturer 33 (2%) 1 (0.6%) 7 (1%) 24 (11%) 1 (0.4%)
Publications in last 3 years
0–5 337 (29%) 16 (10%) 174 (33%) 75 (36%) 72 (27%)
6–15 484 (42%) 62 (39%) 229 (43%) 75 (36%) 118 (44%)
.15 264 (23%) 63 (40%) 96 (18%) 47 (22%) 58 (22%)
Human subjects research in last 3 years
Yes 446 (38%) 73 (47%) 167 (32%) 150 (71%) 56 (21%)
No 711 (61%) 82 (52%) 360 (68%) 60 (29%) 209 (78%)
Sample size 1,165 157 530 210 268
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100% because of item non-response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108451.t001
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intellectual property, a policy objective that can conflict with open,
unfettered data access. Institutionally-required MTAs and other
technology transfer agreements have therefore been viewed among
scientists as imposing restrictions on data sharing rather than
facilitating sharing [22]. In our survey, we found substantial failure
to comply with requirements related to MTAs. Table 2 shows the
frequency of compliance to MTAs and the reasons for noncom-
pliance. When respondents were asked how frequently they shared
data or materials without an MTA even though they knew that
such an agreement was required, 24% said that they sometimes or
always violated MTA policies (57% said they never did). An
additional 9% of respondents were not at all aware of the policies
at their university related to MTAs. Much of MTA noncompli-
ance can be attributed to the bureaucratic difficulties of obtaining
an MTA rather than to philosophical objections. About 85% of
respondents cited the time required to set up an MTA as a very
important or moderately important reason for noncompliance,
while 82% cited the red tape and 78% cited the onerousness of
MTA negotiations. This compares to the relatively fewer
researchers who attributed their noncompliance to a philosophical
opposition to MTAs (48%) and the overly broad scope of MTAs
(38%).
Policy Tools and Infrastructure Influencing Data Sharing
Data sharing plans in grant proposals. One of the biggest
changes in the last decade has been the 2003 NIH policy that
required all NIH grant applications with annual costs exceeding
$500,000 to include data sharing plans [13]. Other federal
agencies such as NSF have enacted similar policies [14]. This
survey is, to our knowledge, the first to ask how proposal reviewers
weight these data sharing plans in their evaluations. In the survey,
we asked respondents whether they had served as a grant reviewer
for federal agencies on life science research proposals and how
important data sharing plans had been in their evaluation of
proposals. Of the 735 respondents who had served as grant
reviewers in the last 3 years, 27% said that the quality of the data
sharing plans had been important or very important in their
evaluation of proposals; an additional 43% said that the plans had
been somewhat important. At the same time, a large minority
(30%) said data sharing plans had not been at all important in
their review of proposals, suggesting that some researchers may
not be supportive of data sharing or of the use of NIH grants
policy to facilitate data sharing.
Data sharing infrastructure and tools. Many data sharing
policies that have been enacted in the last 10 years have been
buttressed by the development of data infrastructure and tools
such as online supplements and third party repositories. Active
researchers may on occasion benefit from these supplements and
repositories but may also find them burdensome since researchers
must also contribute to them. We asked respondents to rate the
degree to which supplements and repositories had helped or
hindered their research. Because this global measure combines
respondents’ experience as both users and contributors, it can be
interpreted as the degree to which researchers are net beneficiaries
of these supplements and repositories, that is, whether the benefits
outweigh the cost of compliance.
Figure 2 shows the degree to which researchers believed that
these tools and new infrastructure had helped or hindered the
progress of their research. In general, online data and methods
supplements were thought to have helped respondents’ own
research: 58% of respondents thought that these online supple-
ments had been helpful. However, the effect of third party
repositories was more muted. About one third of respondents
thought that third party data repositories had helped their research
progress, and 40% thought that third party biomaterials reposi-
tories had helped.
Sanctions for Noncompliance
One intriguing finding is that there appear to be very few formal
or informal sanctions for data sharing noncompliance; if a scientist
fails to share as required or expected, she or he faces few penalties
from other scientists. In our survey, when respondents were asked
about whether they had appealed to a funding agency, journal, or
professional association in response to another scientist’s failure to
share data or biomaterials, only 4% said that they had. Instead of
Figure 1. Influence of policies on data sharing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108451.g001
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scientists more frequently imposed informal sanctions, although
these informal sanctions were also infrequent. For example, when
faced with an academic colleague’s failure to share information or
materials, 17% of respondents said that they had stopped
collaborating with the nonsharing colleague. Eight percent had
taken steps to delay sharing, and 5% had refused to share their
own data with the noncompliant scientist.
Discussion
Over the last decade, life science researchers have faced
significant changes in policies that govern data sharing and in
the data sharing environment [20]: NIH codified the importance
of data sharing by requiring data sharing plans of many of its grant
applications; more journals have begun requiring publication of
online supplements of data and methods; third party repositories
for data and biomaterials have become available; and universities
have begun requiring formal agreements before their researchers
can share data with others outside of their home institution. In this
paper, we report on how these policy changes have, from the
perspective of life science researchers, influenced data sharing and
data withholding practices.
Because this survey inquired about a wide range of policy
developments, we were able to describe the scope and direction of
influence of many different policy changes. Although a full
characterization of the mechanisms underlying these effects is
beyond the purview of the survey, we have found it helpful to
organize our interpretations using the models of scientific
organization and production provided by Dasgupta & David
and Stephan [3], [23]. These primarily economic models, which
also incorporate psychological and sociological theory, present a
useful framework for thinking about scientists’ decisions to share–
decisions based on private returns and relative costs and benefits.
These models are also helpful for thinking about socially optimal
infrastructure and conditions. Given the available data in our
survey and in the existing literature, our discussion of mechanisms
is necessarily speculative but can be a useful basis for organizing
further empirical investigation.
Our survey and analysis point to three important effects of these
policy developments. First, NIH policies have had a strong
influence on increasing data sharing in the life sciences. These
findings build on the work of Piwowar, who found that authors of
studies that were funded by a large number of NIH grants were
more likely to share their study raw data [8]. We conjecture that
the NIH policy effect occurred through several different pathways.
The two primary NIH policies enacted during this period were the
Table 2. Frequency and reasons for MTA policy violations.
A. Frequency of MTA policy violations Weighted % (N=993)
Always 5%
Sometimes 19%
Rarely 10%
Never 57%
Not aware of MTA policies 9%
Weighted % Indicating
Very Important or
B. Reasons for violating policy* Moderately Important Reason
MTA takes too much time 85%
MTA requires too much red tape 82%
MTA negotiations too onerous 78%
Philosophically opposed to MTA restrictions 48%
Scope of MTA overly broad 38%
*among those who reported having violated institutional MTA policies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108451.t002
Figure 2. Effect of data sharing tools progress of research.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108451.g002
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process [13] and the NHGRI GWAS requirement of depositing
GWAS findings in the dbGaP repository [21]. These NIH policies
could have exerted their strong influence through:
N establishing a new default norm of treating new research data
as a public resource to be shared rather than as a private asset
owned by the originating research group;
N making researchers more conscious of and thoughtful about
data sharing and requiring them to specify and take concrete
actions to share new data;
N when projects were equally competitive, favoring projects with
data sharing plans during grant review and penalizing projects
with underdeveloped data sharing plans;
N spurring the use of dbGaP and other third party repositories.
In effect, NIH data sharing policies changed the relative returns
of public and private incentives to sharing. By linking data sharing
to positive things–such as favorable grant review and data release
to third party repositories, which are a less costly form of sharing
for the researcher in terms of time and effort–NIH lowered the
private cost of sharing. In addition, since everyone was now
expected to share, scientists who had previously shared while
others did not no longer asymmetrically bore the cost of sharing.
Put differently, by requiring data sharing of all NIH-supported
scientists, NIH leveled the playing field so that withholding
scientists would not benefit at the expense of sharing scientists.
By broadening data sharing requirements of NIH-supported
scientists, the new NIH GDS policy reinforces this sharing norm.
At the same time, however, the policy also abolishes the GWAS
12-month exclusivity/embargo period [19], thereby increasing the
private cost of sharing and possibly delaying sharing. The net
effect on this specific type of genomic data sharing will be
important to monitor and report.
A second related point is that an important part of the
effectiveness of funding agency policies and journal policies may lie
in reducing the administrative and procedural burdens of sharing.
Funding agencies approve data sharing plans that promise the
release of data or biomaterials to a third party repository or the
posting of data on public websites [13–16]. Journal policies require
the publication of methods or data supplements online [5]. Third
party repositories and online supplements reduce the cost of
sharing by:
N reducing the administrative time and effort costs for the
researcher providing the data because s/he only has to make
the data available once, instead of fulfilling individual requests
separately;
N reducing administrative costs for the providing researcher by
having a third party screen and process requests;
N reducing administrative costs for the requesting researcher
because s/he does not need to go through separate procedures
to contact the originating scientist and will be vetted only once
by a repository.
This standardization and reduction in costs for both data
provider and requestor leads to greater participation in the data
sharing process, as Tenopir et al. have highlighted [10]. In
addition, because the process is more standardized, sharing may
be more inclusive and fair, not dependent on the kinds of personal
relationships and favoritism that may have characterized sharing
through individual requests.
Finally, we have been able to identify some significant policy
gaps and tensions. Our survey is, to our knowledge, the first to
investigate quantitatively three aspects of data sharing tied to the
emergence of new policies: (1) the importance that reviewers place
on data sharing plans; (2) the degree to which sanctions are
imposed for data sharing noncompliance; and (3) the degree of
compliance with institutional MTA policies.
Our finding that almost one third of grant reviewers did not
consider data sharing plans to be at all important is surprising.
That such a high proportion of reviewers ignore data sharing plans
suggests that many leading scientists do not view the dissemination
of raw data or intermediate materials to be a responsibility
accompanying the creation of new knowledge. Or, at the very
least, they do not consider them to have the same importance as
the dissemination of scientific findings or results. Perhaps these
scientists support data sharing in principle but do not think data
sharing plans tied to grant proposals are the means through which
sharing should be encouraged; or they believe it is not their role as
external reviewers to evaluate such plans and cede this role to NIH
program staff; or they are not enthusiastic supporters of data
sharing in general. This will be an important area to investigate
further, particularly now that data sharing plans occupy a more
central place, at least formally, in the new NIH GDS policy.
A second surprising finding is that there appear to be few
sanctions or penalties for noncompliance. Scientists who interact
with noncompliant scientists rarely go through formal appeals
processes either to report the noncompliance or to ensure
compliance. In addition, scientists infrequently sanction noncom-
pliant scientists through informal means, such as breaking off
collaborations. Both economic and sociological theory suggest that
policies are most effective when there is enforcement of policies or
the credible threat of sanctions [24], [25]. A reasonably high
degree of compliance without apparent threat of sanctions is a
puzzle that warrants further study. It could be the case that,
because the policies are relatively new, there is initial compliance,
but as scientists are learning what actions will or will not be
sanctioned, the average level of compliance may change. It could
also be the case that norms have developed around a high level of
data sharing, but even so, sociological theory tells us that informal
sanctions are often necessary to sustain norms [25]. Or there may
be other informal sanctions being imposed that our survey did not
detect; noncompliant scientists may be subject to, say, social
isolation or harsher review in intangible ways during the
publication or grants process. Finally, it may be that the sharing
that is influenced by certain policies is not of a nature that is
substantively helpful to scientists. For example, although there was
a high degree of self-reported compliance with journal publication
policies, only one third of scientists indicated that these policies
had a positive influence on sharing. This discrepancy may reflect
the possibility that scientists would have shared their data even
without the policies, but it may also reflect perfunctory compli-
ance: data that are made available are low-quality, disorganized,
or poorly annotated and therefore difficult to interpret and re-use.
In other words, a lack sanctioning for data sharing noncompliance
may mean that what is being shared may not be all that useful.
This scenario is consistent with previous work by Alsheikh-Ali et al
[5].
A third tension is reflected in our finding that more than one
third of scientists had either violated their institution’s MTA policy
in the last 3 years or did not know the policy. This large-scale
noncompliance is likely to be dismaying news for many
universities, which had implemented these policies in the hope
of providing a structure for balancing scientific needs for sharing
with university intellectual property interests [22], [26]. The sheer
scale of these violations suggests that current institutional MTA
policies have not yet found the right balance, and may be too
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scientists’ professional and scholarly needs. We note that most
researchers who knowingly violated their university’s MTA
policies attributed their noncompliance to the procedural burden
of MTAs. Given the apparent success of repositories in alleviating
these kinds of burdens for researchers, the creation of a central
clearinghouse/repository for MTA requests could improve com-
pliance.
There are several limitations to this study. Our study may
underestimate the degree of data withholding and compliance;
even though respondents were informed that their survey
responses would be completely anonymous, some social desirabil-
ity bias may still exist if respondents underreport withholding and
other behaviors that do not conform to scientific ideals. Second,
researchers’ perceptions of the effects of policies may diverge from
the actual effects of policies on researcher behaviors, although one
could argue that perceptions of policy effects are important in and
of themselves. Third, we did not ask respondents about their
knowledge of data sharing policies, so some answers–for example,
those about the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of policies–may be
attributable to researchers not knowing policies rather than to
their perception of policy consequences. Fourth, we did not
evaluate the quality of data, methods, or materials that were
posted online or submitted to third party repositories. It may be
possible, as discussed earlier, that researchers made only cursory
efforts to comply with data sharing rules and submitted low-quality
or incomplete information. Fifth, there may be bias from non-
response in that non-responders may be different from responders
in systematic ways that relate to data sharing or withholding.
Finally, our sample consisted of research universities; different
patterns of sharing behavior and policy influences may be present
at less research-intensive universities, so our findings may not
extend to these types of institutions.
Overall, the public goods feature of data sharing points to an
important role to be filled by actors like funding agencies and
journals that have a public interest in moving science forward.
These external actors can do what no single private party has an
incentive to do or is able to do on its own: decrease the individual
costs of sharing and level the playing field. Our analysis points to
the NIH and, to a somewhat lesser degree, journals and other
funding agencies, successfully able to play the role of an
independent third party norm-setter and enforcer. Their policies
and accompanying sharing tools have had substantial positive
impact on the sharing and availability of data and biomaterials
and on the progress of the research of individual scientists. There
remains a need for policy refinements, however. That NIH policies
have had a significant positive effect suggests that funding agencies
in general can have important leverage on data sharing. The
success of repositories in reducing costs and the increase in their
use and compliance suggests that this kind of model is to be
encouraged. Tensions in the role of data sharing in the grant
review process, in enforcing policies, and in how to balance
between institutional intellectual property rights and scientists’
norms and needs, will need to be clarified and resolved as science
and scientific sharing models evolve.
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